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Abstract Decision-making in dynamic environments typically requires adaptive
evidence accumulation that weights new evidence more heavily than old observa-
tions. Recent experimental studies of dynamic decision tasks require subjects to
make decisions for which the correct choice switches stochastically throughout a
single trial. In such cases, an ideal observer’s belief is described by an evolution
equation that is doubly stochastic, reflecting stochasticity in the both observa-
tions and environmental changes. In these contexts, we show that the probability
density of the belief can be represented using differential Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations, allowing efficient computation of ensemble statistics. This allows us to
reliably compare normative models to near-normative approximations using, as
model performance metrics, decision response accuracy and Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence of the belief distributions. Such belief distributions could be obtained
empirically from subjects by asking them to report their decision confidence. We
also study how response accuracy is affected by additional internal noise, showing
optimality requires longer integration timescales as more noise is added. Lastly,
we demonstrate that our method can be applied to tasks in which evidence arrives
in a discrete, pulsatile fashion, rather than continuously.
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1 Introduction
Natural environments are fluid, and living beings need to accumulate evidence
adaptively in order to make sound decisions (Behrens et al., 2007; Ossmy et al.,
2013). Theoretical models suggest, and experiments confirm, that in changing en-
vironments animals use decision strategies that value recent observations more
than older ones (Yu and Cohen, 2008; Brea et al., 2014; Urai et al., 2017). For
instance, adaptive evidence accumulation has been explored using a dynamic ver-
sion of the random dot motion discrimination (RDMD) task (Glaze et al., 2015).
In this task, subjects must determine the predominant direction (left or right) of a
field of randomly moving dots while this direction switches stochastically according
to a continuous time Markov process. Since switches are unpredictable, an ideal
observer discounts old information in favor of new evidence. Furthermore, this
discounting rate increases with the rate of environmental changes. This strategy
has been observed in humans and other animals performing dynamic tasks (Glaze
et al., 2015; Piet et al., 2018; Glaze et al., 2018).
Normative models and their approximations have been used successfully to
understand how subjects make decisions (Ratcliff, 1978; Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
In simple cases these models are tractable and make concrete predictions about
response statistics that can be compared to experimental data (Bogacz et al.,
2006; Drugowitsch, 2016; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). However, determining when
subjects use approximately normative decision strategies, and when and how they
fail to do so, can be computationally challenging. For instance, one may wish
to study how a subject’s estimate of the environmental timescale impacts their
response accuracy, or how heuristic evidence-discounting strategies compare to
optimal ones (Glaze et al., 2018; Radillo et al., 2019). To address these questions,
previous work has primarily relied on Monte Carlo simulations (Veliz-Cuba et al.,
2016; Piet et al., 2018), which can be computationally expensive.
Here, we show how to reframe dynamic decision models by deriving correspond-
ing differential Chapman-Kolmogorov (CK) equations (See Eq. (6)). This approach
allows us to quickly compute observer beliefs and performance, and compare mod-
els. Realizations of our models are described by stochastic differential equations
with a drift term that switches according to a two-state Markov process, and leak
terms that discount evidence. To describe these models using CK equations, we
treat the switching process as a source of dichotomous noise, and condition on
its state to track conditional belief densities. These methods allow us to quickly
answer questions about how characteristics of optimal models and their approxi-
mations vary across ranges of task parameters.
Nonlinear, normative models can thus be compared to approximate linear
and cubic discounting models, models with internal noise, and explicitly solv-
able bounded accumulation models with no flux boundaries. These models all can
obtain near-optimal response accuracy, but each has very different belief distribu-
tions. This suggests that subject confidence reports could be used to distinguish
subject decision strategies in data.
Detailed analyses, including belief distribution calculations, can be performed
rapidly and accurately with our methods, allowing us to see why each approximate
model performs better at different task difficulty levels. Monte Carlo methods fare
much worse in terms of computation time and accuracy (See Fig. 9). Our methods
also extend to tasks with pulsatile evidence, where drift and diffusion are replaced
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by jump terms. Our work thus demonstrates how partial differential equation
descriptions of stochastic decision models, previously successful in understanding
decision making in static environments (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1992; Moehlis
et al., 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006), can be extended to dynamic environments.
2 Normative models for dynamic decision-making
We begin by considering the dynamic RDMD task (Glaze et al., 2015; Veliz-Cuba
et al., 2016); an observer looks at a screen of dots which move, on average, right
or left. The average direction of motion, which we call the state s(t), switches
in time between states s+ (right-moving) and s− (left-moving) as a two-state
continuous time Markov process with hazard rate h, so P (s(t + ∆t) 6= s(t)) =
h∆t+ o(∆t). The observer is interrogated at a random time, T , and reports their
belief about the current direction of motion, s(T ). The most reliable state estimate
is obtained by computing the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) between choices from
(noisy) observations, ξ(t), of the moving dot stimulus. Assuming the observer
maintains a fixed estimate of the environmental hazard rate, h˜, this evidence-
accumulation process converges to a single stochastic differential equation (SDE)
for the belief y(t) of the observer (See Veliz-Cuba et al. (2016) and Appendix A
for modeling assumptions and details):
dy(t) = g(t)dt+ ρdWt − 2h˜ sinh(y(t))dt, (1)
where g(t) is a telegraph process that switches between two values, ±g, with
transition rate h, providing evidence about the state, s(t), dWt is an increment of
a Wiener process scaled by ρ, and the observer’s assumed hazard rate, h˜, shapes
the evidence discounting process. If we assume observations of the state s(t) are
drawn from normal distributions, the input to the evidence accumulation model
can be described by a single parameter (Veliz-Cuba et al., 2016). Combining our
assumptions and rescaling time as ht 7→ t, we obtain the following SDE for the
observer’s belief (See Appendix A) in rescaled time (different from the units in
Eq. (1)):
dy(t) = x(t) ·m · dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
drift
+
√
2mdWt︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
− 2 h˜
h
sinh(y(t))dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonlinear leak
, (2)
where x(t) ∈ ±1 is a telegraph process with switching rate equal to 1. The param-
eter m gives the mean information gain of the observer over the average length
of time the environment remains the same (h−1 in original units, 1 in rescaled
units). As m increases the task becomes easier. Thus, we refer to m as the evi-
dence strength. If we take h˜ = h, the explicit dependence of Eq. (2) on h vanishes,
and, as we show, the observer obtains maximal response accuracy.
We are primarily interested in how variations of the evidence strength, m, true
hazard rate, h, and the observer’s hazard rate estimate, h˜, impact the response
accuracy of an observer whose belief is represented by Eq. (2). These quantities
can be changed by varying psychophysical task parameters (Glaze et al., 2015;
Piet et al., 2018; Glaze et al., 2018), and so provide a means of validating Eq. (2)
and its approximations. In addition, a thorough understanding of the normative
model’s performance can provide insights into task parameter ranges in which a
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Fig. 1 The evolution of solutions to the differential Chapman-Kolmogorov (CK) equations.
A: Evolution of the probability density given by Eq. (3) for a fixed realization of the telegraph
process, x(t). A single realization of the belief, y, (solid) and the instantaneous fixed point
of Eq. (2) in the absence of Wiener process noise (dashed) are superimposed. B: Schematic
of the differential CK equations. C: Sample evolution of densities p±(y, t) and ps(y, t) using
Eqs. (4), and (6) respectively. Shaded region shows probability that contributes to accuracy of
observer, computed using Eq. (5). Details on numerical methods are provided in Appendix B.
subject’s belief, y(t), is sensitive to the strategy they use (Radillo et al., 2019).
Obtaining statistics of the solutions to Eq. (2) requires estimating the distribution
of the stochastically evolving belief y(t) across time. Monte Carlo approaches can
require many realizations to accurately characterize belief distributions (See Fig. 9
in Appendix B), and can thus be computationally prohibitive.
2.1 Expressing models using differential Chapman Kolmogorov equations
An alternative to sampling is to derive differential CK equations corresponding
to Eq. (2) and evolve them to obtain time-dependent probability distributions,
p(y, t), of observer belief, y(t), directly. For instance, for a fixed realization of x(t),
the evolution of p(y, t) is described by the following differential CK equation:
∂p(y, t)
∂t
= −x(t)m∂p(y, t)
∂y
+ 2
h˜
h
∂
∂y
[sinh(y)p(y, t)] +m
∂2p(y, t)
∂y2
. (3)
Here the drift terms involve non-autonomous forcing by x(t) and evidence dis-
counting, while the diffusion term arises from the Wiener process. This equation
could be useful for model fitting, since an experimenter would know the realiza-
tion of x(t), and could then fit the single free parameter h˜ using response data. A
simulation using a fixed realization of x(t) shown in Fig. 1A, reveals how the belief
density tracks the state changes, and the peak of the distribution tends towards
the fixed points y¯± of Eq. (2) where 0 = ∓m+ 2 h˜h sinh(y¯±).
The evolution of the belief and performance across trials is determined by
extending our model to include the distribution of possible realizations of x(t).
Treating x(t) as dichotomous noise and defining the joint probability densities
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p±(y, t) := p(y, t|s(t) = s±), we obtain a set of coupled differential CK equa-
tions (Gardiner, 2004):
∂p+
∂t
= −m∂p+
∂y
+ 2
h˜
h
∂
∂y
[sinh(y)p+] +m
∂2p+
∂y2
+ [p− − p+] , (4a)
∂p−
∂t
= +m
∂p−
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
drift
+ 2
h˜
h
∂
∂y
[sinh(y)p−]︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonlinear leak
+m
∂2p−
∂y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
+ [p+ − p−]︸ ︷︷ ︸
switching
. (4b)
The jump terms that exchange probability between p+ and p− in Eqs. (4) arise
from the switches in state, as schematized in Fig. 1B. Eqs. (4) describe the joint
evolution of the density of beliefs across all realizations of x(t). We assume sym-
metric priors, p±(y, 0) = 12δ(y). As we will show, this and the symmetry of Eq. (4)
leads to symmetric solutions p+(y, t) = p−(−y, t).
Response accuracy – the probability of a correct response – is a common mea-
sure of subject performance in decision making tasks (Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Experimentally, response accuracy is defined as the
fraction of correct responses at a specific interrogation time T (Glaze et al., 2015;
Piet et al., 2018). In our model, optimal observers make choices in accordance with
the sign of their belief, sign[y(t)], and response accuracy can be computed from
solutions to Eq. (4) by computing
Acc(T ) =
∫ ∞
0
p+(y, T ) dy +
∫ 0
−∞
p−(y, T ) dy. (5)
The belief, y(t), is correct if it has the same sign as s(t). This fact along with
the inherent odd symmetry of Eqs. (4) suggests a change of variables −y 7→ y in
Eq. (4b). The sum, ps(y, t) := p+(y, t) + p−(−y, t), then evolves according to
∂ps
∂t
= −m∂ps
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
drift
+ 2
h˜
h
∂
∂y
[sinh(y)ps(y, t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonlinear leak
+m
∂2ps
∂y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
+ [ps(−y, t)− ps(y, t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
switching
. (6)
The new density ps(y, t) defines all belief values y > 0 as correct, since the
sign of beliefs in the state s− have been flipped, −y 7→ y, while the sign of all
beliefs in state s+ remain the same. The density ps(y, t) thus describes beliefs
relative to the state, s(t), with each environmental change flipping the sign of
the belief, y(t) (See Fig. 1B). Eq. (5) can therefore be rewritten more simply as
Acc(T ) =
∫∞
0
ps(y, T ) dy. By symmetry, we can recover the two original densities
as p±(y, t) = 12ps(±y, t).
Solving the CK equations numerically, we observe several notable features of
p±(y, t) and ps(y, t) (Fig. 1C). First, the densities p±(y, t) are reflections of one
another (p+(y, t) = p−(−y, t)) due to the symmetry of Eqs. (4). Second, all den-
sities obtain stationarity on the timescale h−1 of the environment, so each is a
unimodal function peaked on the correct side of y = 0. Stationary is reached due
to the eventual equilibration between the drift and state switching. Most of the
mass of the stationary densities is on the correct side of y = 0, and Acc(T ) > 0.5.
The long tail of the distribution ps(y, t) is due to both the constant transfer of
probability from y to −y due to the switching and the Wiener process noise. Both
the nonlinear leak and switching cause the accuracy Acc(T ) to saturate over time.
6 Nicholas W. Barendregt et al.
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Fig. 2 Performance of normative and mistuned nonlinear observer models. A: Evolution of
the density ps(y, t) for m = 50 given by Eq. (6). B: Stationary densities, p¯s(y), for m = 5, 50.
With stronger evidence (m = 50), the stationary distribution has more mass above y = 0.
C: Realizations of the belief variable y for different estimated hazard rates h˜ and fixed true
hazard rate, h = 1. The environmental state, s(t), is shown below (red: s+; yellow: s−).
D: Observer accuracy, for varied h˜, following a change point at t = 0. E: Observer steady-
state accuracy as a function of h˜ for different values of m is maximized when h˜ = h = 1.
F: Curvature of the accuracy functions in E at the maximum, h = 1, as a function of m, shows
the observer is most sensitive to changes in their estimated hazard rate h˜ when m ≈ 5.
Before going further, we note that Eq. (6) satisfies the conditions for existence
of an ergodic process (Gardiner, 2004): The nonzero jump probabilities, and a
positive diffusion coefficient, ensure that the differential CK equation converges to
a unique stationary density as t→∞. This occurs in a relatively short time period;
we therefore focus the remainder of our study on steady-state cases. Typically,
experimental dynamic decision trials are sufficiently long to make this assumption
of stationarity reasonable (Glaze et al., 2015; Piet et al., 2018).
2.2 Evaluating accuracy for mistuned evidence-discounting
Subjects performing decision tasks often must learn the task parameters online to
improve their performance. Our model can be extended to consider hazard rate
learning (Radillo et al., 2017; Glaze et al., 2018), but for now we assume that the
observer uses a fixed estimate h˜ of the hazard rate for their evidence discounting
strategy (Glaze et al., 2015).
How does the response accuracy of an observer whose belief is described by
Eq. (2) change when h˜ is mistuned? Veliz-Cuba et al. (2016) addressed this ques-
tion using Monte Carlo sampling, but computational costs prevented a complete
answer. Since Eq. (2) is rescaled, we take h = 1 for the remainder of our inves-
tigation; all other cases can be recovered by rescaling time. Before asking how
changing h˜ alters accuracy, we first briefly mention how accuracy varies with ev-
idence strength, fixing h˜ = h = 1. The density ps(y, t) computed using Eq. (6)
rapidly converges to the stationary solution, with most of its mass above zero
(Fig. 2A). As m, increases, more mass of the stationary distribution moves to
positive values (Fig. 2B), but the total mass, equal to limT→∞Acc(T ), always
saturates at a value less than 1 due to discounting and state switching.
When the observer misestimates the hazard rate, h˜ 6= h, we expect the long
term accuracy to suffer. Effects on accuracy are subtle, but do follow a gen-
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eral pattern: overestimating the hazard rate (h˜ > h) causes the observer to dis-
count prior evidence too strongly, resulting in more errors driven by observa-
tion noise (Fig. 2C). On the other hand, observers that underestimate the hazard
rate (0 < h˜ < h) discount evidence too slowly and are less adaptive to change
points. Change point triggered response accuracy plots show both of these trends
(Fig. 2D). Accuracy obtains a lower ceiling value during longer epochs without en-
vironmental changes when the discounting rate h˜ is too high. On the other hand,
accuracy recovers more slowly following changes when the discounting rate h˜ is
too low. This bias-variance tradeoff is common to binary choice experiments in
dynamic environments (Glaze et al., 2015, 2018): Low discounting rates lead to
averaging over longer sequences of observations thus reducing the effect of obser-
vational noise while increasing bias. On the other hand, high discounting rates
decrease bias but increase susceptibility to observational noise, resulting in higher
variability. An optimal observer balances these two sources of inaccuracy at a given
environmental hazard rate.
An experimenter may not be able to change discounting rate a subject uses, but
can control the strength of evidence the subject integrates. We therefore asked how
the accuracy of both ideal and mistuned observers is impacted by changes in m.
Not surprisingly, accuracy increases as the strength of evidence increases (Fig. 2E).
More interestingly, the sensitivity (or curvature) of the accuracy function at the
optimum, where h˜ = h, varies nonmonotonically with m, obtaining a peak at
m ≈ 5 (Fig. 2F). Thus response accuracy is most sensitive to model mistuning for
tasks of intermediate difficulty. Intuitively, an observer will always perform close
to chance (Acc ≈ 0.5) when the task is hard (m is low), regardless of the h˜ they
use. The observer will perform well (Acc ≈ 1), again regardless of h˜, if the task
is easy (m is high). At intermediate values of m, the observer’s performance is
sensitive to changes in the model. See Radillo et al. (2019) for a similar analysis
for a dynamic decisions using pulsatile evidence.
This example illustrates how CK equations can be used to obtain response
accuracy statistics, and to compare normative models to related nonlinear models
in which the evidence discounting is mistuned. Such approximate models may
offer plausible descriptions of subject’s strategies, but only capture some of the
possibilities. In the next section, we develop and analyze linear discounting models
that approximate the adaptive evidence accumulation properties of the normative
model and can be tuned to obtain near-optimal response accuracy.
3 Linear evidence discounting in dynamic environments
The nonlinear model defined by Eq. (2) describes the optimal evidence-accumulation
strategy when the estimated hazard rate is correct. However, approximate models
can also obtain response accuracy that is near-optimal. Glaze et al. (2015) and
Veliz-Cuba et al. (2016) demonstrated this using a model that includes a linear
leak term, −λy, in place of the nonlinearity in the normative model. The linear
model is more tractable and can capture the dynamics of subjects’ beliefs in be-
havioral data (Ossmy et al., 2013; Glaze et al., 2015; Piet et al., 2018). We are
interested in how well its statistics can be matched to that of the nonlinear model
and how sensitive this match is to perturbations in the leak rate.
8 Nicholas W. Barendregt et al.
The linear discounting model is the doubly stochastic differential equation,
dy = x(t) ·mdt+
√
2mdWt − λydt, (7)
where λ is a parameter we tune. As before, we can write differential CK equations
corresponding to Eq. (7), and define ps(y, t) = p+(y, t) + p−(−y, t) to obtain the
evolution equation
∂ps
∂t
= −m∂ps
∂y
+ λ
∂
∂y
[yps] +m
∂2ps
∂y2
+ [ps(−y, t)− ps(y, t)] . (8)
As in the nonlinear model, an attracting stationary solution to Eq. (8) exists as
long as λ > 0 (Gardiner, 2004). We thus focus on stationary solutions, p¯s(y), and
make comparisons with the normative model. Our goal is to see how the leak rate,
λ, can be tuned so that the behavior of an observer whose belief evolves according
tof Eq. (7) best matches that of an observer using the normative model, Eq. (2).
We use two metrics to compare our models: first, we consider the accuracy of
the linear model
Acc∞(λ) = lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
0
ps(y, t;λ) dy, (9)
and aim to tune λ so Acc∞(λ) is maximized. Second, to quantify the distance
between the belief distributions, we compute the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
DKL
(
pNs ||pLs
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
pNs (y) ln
[
pNs (y)
pLs (y;λ)
]
dy (10)
between the stationary normative distribution, pNs (y), obtained from Eq. (6), and
the stationary distribution of the linear approximation, pLs (y;λ), obtained from
Eq. (8). While it is possible for models to have nearby belief distributions but
different realizations within trials, minimizing KL divergence still penalizes models
with divergent belief distributions, sure to have distinct trial wise realizations. We
show that choosing the leak rate, λ, that maximizes accuracy or minimizes the KL
divergence leads to different biases (Fig. 3A,B).
Similar to the nonlinear model, the response accuracy of an observer using
linear discounting varies nonmonotonically with λ (Fig. 3A). Observers using small
λ adapt too slowly to change points, and those using a high λ exhibit more noise-
driven errors in the state estimate. The optimal value of λ is achieved by balancing
these error sources, obtaining response accuracy levels very close to those of the
normative model. Furthermore, the λ = λAccopt that maximizes response accuracy
increases as m is increased, since evidence needs to be discounted more rapidly
in environments with higher evidence strengths (Fig. 3C). The KL divergence
also varies nonmonotonically with λ for all values of m (Fig. 3B), obtaining a
minimum at a value λ = λKLopt that also increases with m, but is higher than
λAccopt . Understanding this result requires a more detailed analysis of the stationary
densities of the normative and linear models, as we discuss below.
How important is it to tune λ in the linear model? If linear models are more
sensitive to fine tuning for some task parameter ranges than the normative model,
experimentalists could use these task parameter ranges to distinguish subjects’
strategies. When m is small the belief distributions p¯Ls (y) and p¯
N
s (y) are close
whether λ = λAccopt , or λ = λ
KL
opt (Fig. 3C,E), but this agreement is sensitive to
Analyzing dynamic decision-making models using Chapman-Kolmogorov equations 9
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Fig. 3 Linear two-alternative forced-choice task model. A: Performance of the linear observer
as a function of discounting rate, λ, for different evidence strengths, m. B: KL divergence
between the densities evolving under the normative and linear model as a function of λ,
for different values of m. C: Optimal discounting rate for each metric as a function of m.
D: Sensitivity of discounting rate on optimality metric as a function of m. E: Comparison
of the normative density, and the linear density with λ = λAccopt chosen to maximize accuracy
(red), or with λ = λKLopt chosen to minimize KL divergence (blue) for m = 5 (top) and m = 50
(bottom).
changes in λ (Fig. 3D). Thus, both the accuracy and KL divergence are sensi-
tive to λ when m is small. For large m the two belief distributions are not close
(Fig. 3E), and the KL divergence and difference in accuracy are insensitive to
changes in λ. This disagreement in belief distribution at high m is less important
when optimizing the accuracy of the linear model, as we only need to maximize
the mass of p¯Ls above y = 0.
Differences between the two models become apparent if we interrogate ob-
servers about their confidence and not just their choice (Fig. 3E). We hypothesize
that if one were to fit behavioral data using response accuracy, and compare them
to fits using subject’s confidence reports, the second approach would result in
stronger leak rates. Indeed, considerations of subject confidence as a proxy for
LLR has been an important development in recent decision making studies (Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009; Van Den Berg et al., 2016), and we will revisit this view in Sec-
tion 7. However, most behavioral studies of decisions in dynamic environments do
not include confidence reports, and so model fits are typically performed by con-
sidering accuracy data. We thus focus primarily on this measure for the remainder
of our study.
4 Tuning evidence accumulation to account for internal noise
We next explore the impact of additional noise sources on the performance of
both the nonlinear and linear models. Since the nervous system is inherently
noisy (Faisal et al., 2008), it is important to consider sources of variability on
top of the stochasticity of observations when developing and fitting decision mod-
els (Smith, 2010). Brunton et al. (2013) showed that the responses of humans and
rats in an auditory clicks task are best described by models that include internally
generated noise. Piet et al. (2018) showed that the same is the case in a dynamic
clicks task. With this in mind, we extend our analysis to incorporate an additional
independent noise source. Such variability could arise in early sensory areas or
10 Nicholas W. Barendregt et al.
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Fig. 4 Internal noise reduces accuracy of dynamic decisions. A: Superimposed realizations
of the nonlinear model described by Eq. (11) with added internal noise as the magnitude of
internal noise, D, is varied (legend). B: Performance of nonlinear model Eq. (13) as internal
noise amplitude D is varied for different evidence strengths m (legend). Vertical lines corre-
spond to D = m. C: Accuracy of nonlinear model Eq. (11) with added internal noise as a
function of h˜ and D for m = 10. The blue line shows the optimal value of h˜ for a given D,
when the environmental hazard rate, h = 1, is fixed. D: Leak rate λ that maximizes accuracy
for a given evidence strength m and internal noise amplitude D.
as part of the decision process (Banko´ et al., 2011). For simplicity, we model the
source of noise as an independent Wiener process, Xt, with variance scaled by a
parameter D. The nonlinear model then takes the form,
dy = x(t) ·mdt+
√
2mdWt +
√
2DdXt − 2 h˜
h
sinh(y)dt. (11)
Adding internal noise means that Eq. (11) is no longer a normative model: When
D > 0, noise corrupts state estimates (Fig. 4A), and maximal response accuracy
is achieved when h˜ < h, as we show. The linear model is updated similarly,
dy = x(t) ·mdt+
√
2mdWt +
√
2DdXt − λydt. (12)
In either model, the Wiener processes, dWt and dXt, are independent.
As before, we can derive an evolution equation for the ensemble of realizations
of these stochastic processes (See Appendix C). For the nonlinear Eq. (11), the
corresponding differential CK equation is
∂ps
∂t
=−m∂ps
∂y
+ 2
h˜
h
∂
∂y
[sinh(y)ps] + [m+D]
∂2ps
∂y2
+ [ps(−y, t)− ps(y, t)] , (13)
and the corresponding differential CK equation for Eq. (12) is
∂ps
∂t
= −m∂ps
∂y
+ λ
∂
∂y
[yps] + [m+D]
∂2ps
∂y2
+ [ps(−y, t)− ps(y, t)] . (14)
Thus, only the constants scaling the diffusion term change as compared to the
models without internal noise, Eqs. (6) and (8).
How should evidence accumulation be adjusted to maximize response accuracy
as the evidence strength and internal noise change? As noted earlier, humans and
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rats integrate internal noise in addition to information obtained from the stimu-
lus itself (Glaze et al., 2015; Piet et al., 2018). It is therefore plausible that they
adjust their stimulus integration strategies to limit the impact of internal noise
on performance. Increasing the magnitude of internal noise, D, reduces response
accuracy in the nonlinear model (Fig. 4A,B), and there there is a steep drop off
in response accuracy when D slightly exceeds m (Fig. 4B). This occurs whether h˜
is fixed or allowed to vary. When h˜ can be tuned, the value of h˜ that maximizes
response accuracy decreases as D is increased (Fig. 4C): The observer must inte-
grate over longer timescales to average the increased internal noise and obtain a
reliable estimate of the state. However, this is balanced by the need to adapt to
change points as quickly as possible. Similarly, in the linear model the leak rate,
λ, that maximizes accuracy decreases as D is increased (Fig. 4D). In general, as
internal noise increases the observer must thus integrate over longer timescales to
obtain the most accurate estimate of the state.
5 Discounting by bounding observer confidence
As an alternative to models that discount evidence with leak terms, we next con-
sider models with no leak, and no-flux boundaries at y = ±β (Glaze et al., 2015).
This prevents the belief from straying outside of the range −β ≤ y ≤ β:
dy =

x(t) ·mdt+√2m · dWt, y ∈ (−β, β),
min(x(t) ·mdt+√2m · dWt, 0), y ≥ +β,
max(x(t) ·mdt+√2m · dWt, 0), y ≤ −β.
(15)
Unlike classic DDMs for two alternative free response tasks (Smith and Ratcliff,
2004; Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007), the process does not terminate
when the belief, y, reaches one of the boundaries ±β.
More careful treatments of the reflecting boundary are possible, by considering
the limit of a discrete-time biased random walk on a lattice (Erban and Chapman,
2007), but we prefer the more intuitive description of Eq. (15), whose statistics we
expect to match those of more detailed models. Fig. 5A shows example realizations
of this stochastic process as the boundary location, β, is varied, illustrating how
encounters with the no-flux boundaries serve to discount evidence.
The steady-state solution of the differential CK equations corresponding to
Eq. (15) can be obtained exactly. The evolution equations are
∂p±(y, t)
∂t
= ∓m∂p±(y, t)
∂y
±m∂
2p±(y, t)
∂y2
+ [p∓(y, t)− p±(y, t)] , (16)
and the no flux (Robin) boundary conditions imply that
±mp±(±β, t)−m∂p±(±β, t)
∂y
= 0.
Since Eq. (16) is an advection-diffusion equation, the proper reflecting boundary is
a Robin boundary (Gardiner, 2004). It can be shown that the stationary solution
p¯s(y) = p¯+(y) + p¯−(−y) to Eq. (16) restricted by the boundary conditions is
p¯s(y) = C1 + C2
[
eqy + (mq − (m+ 1)) e−qy
]
. (17)
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Fig. 5 Bounded accumulator dynamics and performance. A: Superimposed stochastic re-
alizations of Eq. (15) with different boundaries, β (legend). B: Superimposed steady-state
distributions, p¯s(y), computed from Eq. (17). C: Tuning the boundary β, allows the accu-
racy of the bounded accumulator, Eq. (18), to closely match that of the normative model
described by Eq. (2) (dashed lines) for various m (legend). D: The optimal bound, βopt,
that maximizes accuracy of the bounded accumulator as a function of m. E: Sensitivity of
the bounded accumulator model to changes in β near βopt as a function of m. F: Differ-
ence in accuracy between the optimally tuned bounded accumulator and normative models
(∆Acc := AccB(m) − AccN (m)) compared to accuracy difference between optimally tuned
linear and normative models (∆Acc := AccL(m)−AccN (m)) as a function of m.
The constants C1 and C2 and details of the derivation are given in Appendix D.
The distribution is more shallow for higher β, as the stochastic trajectories
spread over the admissible belief range (Fig. 5B). This is analogous to the sharp-
ening (broadening) of the stationary distributions of the linear model that occurs
as the leak rate is increased (decreased). Note here that decreasing β strengthens
the discounting effect of the reflecting boundaries.
To compute steady state accuracy of the bounded accumulator model, we can
integrate Eq. (17) to obtain a formula that depends on m and β:
Acc∞(β) =
∫ β
0
p¯s(y) dy = C1β +
C2
(
1− e−qβ)
q
[
eqβ + (mq − (m+ 1))
]
. (18)
For fixed m, Eq. (18) varies nonmonotonically with β, so there is a single β = βopt
which maximizes the accuracy (Fig. 5C). As m increases, this optimal β increases,
suggesting that as the evidence is strengthened (Fig. 5D), less discounting is
needed, in contrast to the linear discounting model. Accuracy is most sensitive
to changes in β when m is small (Fig. 5E).
We also compare the performance of the bounded accumulator model with
that of the linear discounting model (Fig. 5F). At low m, linear discounting per-
forms better than the bounded accumulator, obtaining accuracy closer to that of
the normative model. The opposite is true at high m, in which case the bounded
accumulator model performs better. This may be related to the fact that linear dis-
counting better approximates the local dynamics of the nonlinearity −2h sinh(y)
when m is small (and thus y is closer to 0), whereas a sharp boundary better ap-
proximates the strong discounting of the nonlinearity at higher values of y (reached
when m is large) (Glaze et al., 2015). Both models perform quite close to the nor-
mative model when their discounting parameters are fine tuned.
Despite the bounded accumulator model’s near optimal response accuracy, it
is important to note that the distributions p¯s(y) of the bounded accumulator
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Fig. 6 Cubic discounting functions: fC(y) = −λ1y−λ2y3. A: Compared with the normative
fN (y) = −2 sinh(y) and linear fL(y) = −λ1y discounting functions. B: Accuracy as a function
of discounting rates (λ1, λ2), for m = 1. Dot denotes maximizer. C: Difference in accuracy
between optimally tuned cubic and linear models (∆Acc := AccC(m) − AccL(m)) increase
with m. D: Accuracy as a function of λ1 for different m (legend). E: Schematic of potential
functions of linear model (top) and cubic model (bottom) given the state s(t). The cubic model
has been mistuned so that λ2 = 1 and λ1 < 0, resulting in a double-potential well function.
(Fig. 5B) are very different from those of the normative (Fig. 2B) or even the
linear model (Fig. 3E,F). In this respect, fitting subject confidence reports using
the bounded accumulator would give very different results; we return to this point
in Section 7.
6 Generalized discounting functions with a cubic example
There are many combinations of discounting functions and boundaries that could
be used to approximate the nonlinearity fN (y) = −2h˜ sinh(y) in the normative
model (Wilson et al., 2010). To use our methods, we require discounting functions,
f(y), that are (i) odd (f(−y) = −f(y)), and (ii) negative for some half-infinite
positive region of y (f(y) > 0 for y ∈ (a,∞) where a ≥ 0); these conditions en-
sure convergence to non-trivial stationary distributions. For a general discounting
function, the rescaled model then takes the form
dy(t) = x(t) ·mdt+
√
2mdWt + f(y)dt, (19)
with the differential CK equation for ps(y, t) = p+(y, t) + p−(−y, t) given
∂ps
∂t
= −m∂ps
∂y
− ∂
∂y
[f(y)ps(y, t)] +m
∂2ps
∂y2
+ [ps(−y, t)− ps(y, t)] .
This family of evidence-discounting models could also incorporate boundary con-
ditions as in the previous section.
A natural way to extend the linear is to introduce a cubic discounting function
fC(y) = −λ1y − λ2y3 (Piet et al., 2018) which can be tuned to better match the
nonlinearity of the normative model (Fig. 6A). As shown in Section 7, this vastly
improves the agreement between the stationary probability density p¯Cs (y) and that
of the normative model, p¯Ns (y), though the model is more complex (Friedman et al.,
2001). Since the linear model already obtains near-optimal accuracy (Fig. 3A), we
find, as expected, that the best cubic model is only slightly more accurate. In fact,
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accuracy drops rapidly as λ2 is changed from its optimal value (Fig. 6B). We also
calculated the difference between the accuracy of the optimal cubic model and op-
timal linear model, ∆Acc(m) = AccC(m)−AccL(m) (Fig. 6C). Accuracy improves
by incorporating the cubic term at high m values, since nonlinear discounting is
most needed at higher y values.
However, mistuning the cubic model can considerably limit accuracy when the
attractor structure of Eq. (19) with f(y) = fC(y) is qualitatively changed (Fig.
6D). Equilibria of the noise-free model are identified by fixing x(t) = ±1 and
solving the cubic equation 0 = ±m− λ1y− λ2y3. Fixing λ2 > 0, we find a critical
value, λc1 < 0 for which the attractor structure of the model switches from a single
stable fixed point to two (Fig. 6E). Such bistable systems can be advantageous for
working memory (Brody et al., 2003), but can hinder belief switches necessary in
dynamic environments after state transitions. Fig. 6D shows that the accuracy of
the model decreases as λ1 is decreased and the potential wells deepen. In these
cases, the observer retains an erroneous belief long after the state has changed.
Thus, the cubic nonlinearity only marginally improves accuracy, but can have
deleterious effects if mistuned. However, we may wish to use other measures of
a subject’s belief to fit and validate models. In the next section we therefore ask
how the full belief distribution changes with the choice of discounting function,
and use KL divergence to quantify differences between different models.
7 Revisiting KL divergence for fitting observer belief distributions
Subject reports of confidence in decision-making tasks can be associated with LLRs
of normative evidence accumulation models (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Thus, it
may be possible to empirically estimate the belief distribution, ps(y, t), represented
by our models, by asking subjects to report confidence in their choice. This provides
an additional advantage of our approach over Monte Carlo simulations, as using
the latter to estimate belief distributions can be costly and inaccurate (See Fig. 9
in Appendix B). As we show here, a better understanding of how our normative
and approximate models deviate from one another can be gleaned by comparing
their belief distributions and computing KL divergence measures.
We provide intuition for the differences we will see by plotting single stochas-
tic realizations of all four models (Fig. 7A). The linear and (even better) the
cubic models closely track the belief trajectory of the normative model, while the
bounded accumulator model strays the farthest. Comparing belief distributions of
all four models that minimize KL divergence with the normative model at m = 50
(Fig. 7B), we see that the cubic model matches the normative model far better
than the linear model. This is due to the nonlinearity incorporated by the cu-
bic term, which attenuates the tail of the distribution at high y values. On the
other hand, the best fit bounded accumulator distribution is far from that of the
normative model.
Computing the KL divergence between models, we arrive at two main conclu-
sions: First, despite the fact that the bounded accumulator obtains near optimal
accuracy, the corresponding belief distribution, p¯Bs (y), deviates from that of the
normative model, p¯Ns (y), at all evidence strength values, m (Fig. 7C). On the
other hand, though the cubic model only mildly increases response accuracy over
the linear model, the corresponding belief distribution, p¯Cs (y), matches that of
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Fig. 7 Minimizing KL divergence in our approximate models. A: Single realization of linear,
cubic, and bounded models tuned to minimize KL divergence m = 50. Normative realization
is shown for comparison (legend). B: Distributions of linear, cubic, and bounded models tuned
to minimize KL divergence, again for m = 50. Left vertical axis gives normative, linear, and
cubic scale, while right axis gives bounded accumulator scale. C: Minimum KL divergence for
linear and bounded models as a function of m. D: Difference in KL between optimal linear
and cubic models (∆KL := KLL(m)−KLC(m)) as a function of m.
the normative model, p¯Ns (y), far better (Fig. 7D). Our differential CK framework
allowed us to obtain these results quickly and accurately.
8 Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for clicks-task models
Thus far, we have been concerned with models that represent evidence accumula-
tion in a RDMD task (Glaze et al., 2015), in which subjects receive a continuous
flow of evidence during a trial. We next examine models of observers accumulating
discretely timed, pulsatile evidence.
Piet et al. (2018) showed rats can perform an auditory clicks task of this type
near-optimally. In this experiment, subjects are presented with two trains of clicks
(one to the left ear, the other to the right), each generated by a Poisson process
with instantaneous rates rL(t) and rR(t). The rates evolve according to a two-state
continuous time Markov process with hazard rate h so that P(rj(t+dt) 6= rj(t)) =
h · dt + o(dt), rR(t) 6= rL(t) always, and rR,L(t) ∈ r± with r+ > r−. We define
the state (rR(t), rL(t)) = (r±, r∓) as s±. Observations ξ(t) are now comprised of
the presence or absence of left or right clicks at each time t. See Piet et al. (2018);
Radillo et al. (2019) for details. At an interrogation time, T , the observer must
respond which side currently has the higher click rate r+.
The model for an ideal observer’s belief y(t) = log
P(s+|ξ(t))
P(s−|ξ(t)) is given by
dy
dt
= κ
∞∑
j=1
[
δ
(
t− tjR
)
− δ
(
t− tjL
)]
− 2h sinh(y), (20)
where κ = ln
(
r+
r−
)
is the height of each evidence increment, tjR and t
j
L are the right
and left click times, and h is the hazard rate. Additionally, we define the inputs’
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as SNR =
r+−r−√
r++r−
(Skellam, 1946). See Radillo et al.
(2019) for a detailed discussion of how the SNR shapes model response accuracy.
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Rather than carrying out another detailed analysis of several different approx-
imations and perturbations to Eq. (20), we simply wish to show that our CK
approach works and provides useful insights for click stimulus models. To sample
the space of possible approximate models, we fix h = 1 and focus on a linear dis-
counting and bounded accumulator model. Since Piet et al. (2018) was specifically
interested in internal noise perturbed versions of the linear model, we start with
this example, and then consider a bounded accumulator without internal noise
that affords us explicit results.
The linear model with internal noise takes the form (Piet et al., 2018)
dy = κ
∞∑
j=1
[
δ
(
t− tjR
)
− δ
(
t− tjL
)]
dt− λy · dt+
√
2DdXt. (21)
Here λ is the leak rate, D is the strength of the internal noise, and Xt is a Wiener
process. We then define conditional densities p+(y, t) and p−(y, t) as before, writing
coupled differential CK equations as
∂p±(y, t)
∂t
= r± [p±(y − κ, t)− p±(y, t)] + r∓ [p±(y + κ, t)− p±(y, t)]
+λ
∂
∂y
[yp±(y, t)] +D
∂2p±(y, t)
∂y2
+ p∓(y, t)− p±(y, t), (22)
Unlike our differential CK equations for models with continuously arriving evi-
dence, the pulses flow probability between y ± κ and y, preventing us from com-
bining p±(y, t) with a change of variables and obtaining a single CK equation.
Simulating Eq. (22) directly, we study how response accuracy depends on the leak
and the click rates (Radillo et al., 2019). Similar to our linear model with a drift
diffusion signal, accuracy varies nonmonotonically with λ (Fig. 8A), and is maxi-
mized at λ = λopt for a given pair (r+, r−) as plotted in Fig. 8B. Fixing SNR does
not fix λopt as Radillo et al. (2019) showed for the normative model. As either r+
or r− is increased, λopt increases (Fig. 8B), suggesting that increasing the rate of
true or erroneous pulses warrants stronger evidence discounting.
We also consider a bounded accumulator with no explicit discounting function.
In parallel with Eq. (16), we define the model as
dy
dt
=

κ
∑∞
j=1
[
δ
(
t− tjR
)
− δ
(
t− tjL
)]
, y ∈ (−κβ, κβ),
min(κ
∑∞
j=1
[
δ
(
t− tjR
)
− δ
(
t− tjL
)]
, 0), y ≥ +κβ,
max(κ
∑∞
j=1
[
δ
(
t− tjR
)
− δ
(
t− tjL
)]
, 0), y ≤ −κβ.
The observer’s belief is restricted to the interval [−κβ, κβ] for some positive in-
teger β ∈ Z>0. The corresponding differential CK equations can be written as a
discretized system since y only visits integer multiples of κ between −κβ to κβ.
Rescaling n = y/κ yields the following system
∂p±
∂t
= r± [p±(n− 1, t)− p±] + r∓ [p±(n+ 1, t)− p±] + p∓ − p±, (23)
for n = −β + 1, ..., β − 1, along with the boundary equations
0 = −r±p±(−β, t) + r∓p±(−β + 1, t) + p∓(−β, t)− p±(−β, t),
0 = r±p±(β − 1, t)− r∓p±(β, t) + p∓(β, t)− p±(β, t).
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Fig. 8 Performance of heuristic strategies on the dynamic clicks task.A:Accuracy of the linear
model varies nonmonotonically with the leak rate, λ for different SNR =
r+−r−√
r++r−
(Radillo
et al., 2019) with r− = 30 is fixed. B: Heatmap of optimal leak rate, λ = λopt, as a function
of r+ and r− for the linear model. C: Accuracy of the bounded accumulator model given by
Eq. (24) varies with the boundary value β for different SNR as r− = 30 is fixed. D: Heatmap
of optimal β = βopt as a function of r+ and r− for bounded accumulator clicks model.
As with the continuum version of the bounded accumulator, the stationary solution
p¯(n) can be obtained explicitly
p¯s(n) = C1 + C2q
n
+ + C3q
n
−, (24)
with constants q±, C1, C2, and C3 and the derivation given in Appendix E.
The dependence of the optimal β = βopt, which maximizes response accuracy,
on r+ and r− is nuanced. Fixing r− = 30, for a given SNR =
r+−r−√
r++r−
, there is
an optimal β = βopt maximizing response accuracy (Fig. 8C). However, there is a
surprisingly large range of (r+, r−) values within which β = 1 is optimal (Fig. 8D).
There is a range of (r+, r−) for which the discounting timescale (breadth of the
interval [−βκ, βκ]) increases with task difficulty, as long as r+ is sufficiently far
from r−. However, when r− ≈ r+, βopt = 1, despite task difficulty. We conjecture
this bound improves performance by instituting a “two click” strategy, in which
the observer needs to only hear two clicks on the high click rate side to register
a correct current belief. This limits the size of erroneous excursions wrong clicks
can cause, as the bounds limit the effect of many misatributed clicks in a row.
Our methods thus extend to models with pulsatile evidence accumulation,
illustrating their broad applicability. We can efficiently study model performance
and its dependence on task parameters, and even explicitly analyze the resulting
equations to determine how approximate models perform.
9 Conclusion
Decision-making models are key to understanding how animals integrate evidence
to make choices in nature. Animals most likely use heuristic strategies in dynamic
tasks as they can be easier to implement, and have utility that is close to opti-
mal (Rahnev and Denison, 2018). Normative models are still useful, however, as
subject performance can be benchmarked against them, allowing possible insights
into how and why organisms fail to perform optimally (Geisler, 2003). Investigating
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optimal models and their approximations requires simulations across large param-
eter spaces; these necessarily require rapid simulation techniques to obtain refined
results. Efficient computational methods are therefore essential for the analysis of
evidence accumulation models, and their application to experiment design.
Using differential CK equations to describe ensembles of decision model re-
alizations speeds up computation and describes the time-dependent probability
density of an observer’s belief. Thus, traditional metrics of performance (e.g., ac-
curacy) and other less common model comparison metrics (KL divergence) can be
computed rapidly. This opens new avenues for comparing normative and heuristic
decision making models, and for determining task parameter ranges to distinguish
models. There is also hope that in high throughput experiments, sufficient data
could be collected to specify subject confidence distributions, which could be fit,
or compared to model predictions (Piet et al., 2019).
Doubly stochastic and jump-diffusion models appear in a number of other
contexts in neuroscience and beyond (Hanson, 2007; Horsthemke and Lefever,
2006). For instance, dichotomous and white noise have been included in linear
integrate and fire (LIF) models to model voltage or channel fluctuations (Droste
and Lindner, 2014, 2017; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2002). The interspike interval
statistics of these models can be analyzed directly by considering the corresponding
differential CK equations. Unlike the models we consider here, the LIF model
includes a single absorbing boundary and reset condition, which must be treated
carefully when defining the flow of probability through state space.
We have studied a number heuristic models and computed how their perfor-
mance depends on both task parameters and evidence discounting parameters.
Well tuned heuristic models, such as the linear and bounded accumulator models,
can in fact exhibit near-normative performance (Glaze et al., 2015; Veliz-Cuba
et al., 2016; Radillo et al., 2019). There are specific parameter regimes (low ver-
sus high m) in which certain heuristic models perform better; our differential CK
methods have allowed us to explore these regimes rapidly. Importantly, Brunton
et al. (2013), and Piet et al. (2018) have shown that internal noise determines sub-
ject performance in decision tasks, in addition to the variability of the signal. We
have confirmed that including internal noise causes optimal evidence-discounting
to be weakened as noise increases, and that accuracy drops off precipitously once
the amplitude of internal noise reaches that of the signal.
Our approach can also be used by experimentalists testing observer perfor-
mance in dynamic-decision tasks. Models can thus guide one’s choice of task pa-
rameters when setting up experiments to determine the strategies subjects use to
make decisions in dynamic environments. As in Radillo et al. (2019), we found that
accuracy is most sensitive to one’s choice of model and tuning when tasks are of
intermediate difficulty. In contrast, tasks that are easy (hard) are performed well
(poorly) by most models. Also, the full belief distributions generated by our meth-
ods could be subsampled to produce randomized responses for comparison with
subject data (Drugowitsch, 2016). It may also be feasible to use our differential
CK equations to model trial-to-trial belief distributions of subjects, as affected by
internal noise hidden to the experimentalist. This approach was recently developed
in Piet et al. (2019) to account for for variability in subject responses.
Model development can also help to inspire new experimental tasks, based on
predictions and ideas that arise from mathematically describing subjects’ decision
processes. One possible extension of the tasks we have discussed here could con-
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sider stochastic switches in evidence quality within trials. Past work has focused
on both theoretical predictions and experimental results associated with task dif-
ficulty switching between trials (Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014),
suggesting subjects’ decision thresholds may vary with time as task difficulty is
inferred throughout the trial. When both the state and difficulty switch stochasti-
cally within a trial, the effective state is governed by a multi-state continuous time
Markov process. Details that could be introduced into such multi-state models,
such as asymmetric evidence qualities and the ability to turn off evidence, offer
a rich framework for applying the stochastic methods we have developed here.
Another extension we could consider in our models is the recently developed click
task model with stochastically drawn click heights (Piet et al., 2018; Radillo et al.,
2019). Jumps would then be represented by an integral over the entire belief space,
requiring new computational methods for efficient simulation of the associated dif-
ferential CK equations.
In recent years, decision-making models and experiments have been developed
to incorporate more naturalistic scenarios in which the environment changes in
fluid yet predictable ways. The associated normative models can be complex, and
efficient simulation techniques are important for evaluating performance across
different models and interpreting experimental decision data from psychophysics
tasks. It is also important to develop families of plausible heuristic models that
subjects may be implementing, and to find ways to compare them with norma-
tive models. Our Chapman-Kolmogorov framework provides a straightforward and
robust way to achieve these goals.
Code availability
Refer to https://github.com/nwbarendregt/DynamicDecisionCKEquations for the MATLAB
finite difference code used to perform the analysis and generate figures.
A Normative evidence-accumulation in dynamic environments
Here we derive the continuum limit of the Bayesian update equation for continuous evidence
accumulation in a changing environment. Starting with the discrete time model, we define
Ln,± = P(s(tn) = s±|ξ1:n) as the probability of being in state s± at time tn assuming a
sequence of observations ξ1:n. The state s(t) changes between evenly spaced time points t1:n
(with ∆t := tn − tn−1) at a hazard rate h∆t := h · ∆t := P(s(tn) = s∓|s(tn−1) = s±).
The likelihood function f∆t,±(ξ) = P(ξ|s = s±;∆t) is the conditional probability of observing
sample ξ given state s±, parameterized by ∆t.
We begin by assuming an ideal observer who knows the environmental hazard rate h.
Using Bayes’ rule and the law of total probability, we can relate Ln,± to the probability at
the previous time step according to the weighted sum (Veliz-Cuba et al., 2016)
Ln,± = f∆t,±(ξn)
P(ξ1:n)
P(ξ1:n)
[(1− h∆t)Ln−1,± + h∆tLn−1,∓] , (25)
where L0,± = P(s(t0) = s±). Defining yn = log
Ln,+
Ln,−
, we can compute
∆yn := yn − yn−1 = log f∆t,+(ξn)
f∆t,−(ξn)
+ log
1− h∆t + h∆te−yn−1
1− h∆t + h∆teyn−1
. (26)
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In search of the continuum limit of this equation, we assume 0 < ∆t 1, 0 < |∆yn|  1, and
use the approximation log(1 + z) ≈ z to obtain
∆yn ≈ log f∆t,+(ξn)
f∆t,−(ξn)
− 2h ·∆t sinh(yn). (27)
Replacing the index n with the time t and applying the functional central limit theorem as in
Billingsley (2008); Bogacz et al. (2006), we can write Eq. (27) as
∆yt ≈ ∆tg∆t(t) +
√
∆tρ∆t(t)η − 2h ·∆t sinh(yt), (28)
where η is a random variable with a standard normal distribution and
g∆t(t) :=
1
∆t
Eξ
[
log
f∆t,+(ξ)
f∆t,−(ξ)
∣∣∣s(t)] , ρ2∆t(t) := 1∆tVarξ
[
log
f∆t,+(ξ)
f∆t,−(ξ)
∣∣∣s(t)] . (29)
The drift g∆t and variance ρ
2
∆t diverge unless f∆t,±(ξ) are scaled appropriately in the ∆t→ 0
limit. A reasonable assumption that can be made to compute g∆t and ρ
2
∆t explicitly is to take
observations ξ to follow normal distributions with mean and variance scaled by ∆t (Bogacz
et al., 2006; Veliz-Cuba et al., 2016)
f∆t,±(ξ) =
1√
2pi∆tσ2
e−(ξ∓∆µ)
2/(2∆tσ2),
so we can compute the limits of Eq. (29) as
g(t) = lim
∆t→0
g∆t(t) ∈ ±2µ
2
σ2
= ±g, (30a)
ρ2(t) = lim
∆t→0
ρ2∆t(t) =
4µ2
σ2
= ρ2, (30b)
where g(t) ∈ {+g,−g} is a telegraph process with probability masses P(±g, t) evolving as
P˙(±g, t) = h [P(∓g, t)− P(±g, t)] and ρ2(t) = ρ2 remains constant. Therefore, the continuum
limit (∆t→ 0) of Eq. (28) is
dy(t) = g(t)dt+ ρdWt − 2h sinh(y(t))dt, (31)
where dW is a standard Wiener process. Eq. (31) provide the normative model of evidence
accumulation for an observer who knows the hazard rate h and wishes to infer the sign of g(t)
at time t with maximal accuracy (Glaze et al., 2015; Veliz-Cuba et al., 2016).
However, we are also interested in near-normative models in which the observer assumes
an incorrect hazard rate h˜ 6= h. In such a case, the analysis proceeds as before, with the
probabilistic inference process simply involving h˜ now rather than h, and the result is
dy(t) = g(t)dt+ ρdWt − 2h˜ sinh(y(t))dt. (32)
Lastly, note that if indeed the original observations ξ are drawn from normal distributions,
Eq. (30) states g(t) ∈ ±g where g = 2µ2/σ2 and ρ2 = 2g. Rescaling time ht 7→ t, we can then
express Eq. (32) in terms of the following rescaled equation
dy(t) = x(t)mdt+
√
2mdWt − 2 h˜
h
sinh(y)dt,
where m = 2µ2/(hσ2) and x(t) ∈ ±1 is a telegraph process with hazard rate 1, as shown in
Eq. (2) of the main text.
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Fig. 9 Comparison of CK equations with Monte Carlo sampling. A: Calculation of accuracy
of mistuned nonlinear leak model for m = 5. Monte Carlo simulations run with varied number
of samples superimposed (legend). B: Runtime (red) and L2 error (blue) of Monte Carlo simu-
lations as a function of sample size. Runtime of CK equations (black dashed) superimposed for
comparison. L2 error of Monte Carlo simulations calculated against results from CK equations.
B Finite difference methods for Chapman-Kolmogorov equations
We use a finite difference method to simulate the differential CK equations. The method is
exemplified here for the normative CK equation from Eq. (6), but a similar approach is also
used for the linear, cubic, and pulsatile equations. For stability purposes, our method uses
centered differences in y and backward-Euler in t. This gives the following finite difference
approximations of the functions and their derivatives in Eq. (6):
∂ps(y, t)
∂t
≈ ps(y, t+∆t)− ps(y, t)
∆t
, ps(y, t) ≈ ps(y, t+∆t),
∂ps(y, t)
∂y
≈ ps(y +∆y, t+∆t)− ps(y −∆y, t+∆t)
2∆y
,
∂2ps(y, t)
∂y2
≈ ps(y −∆y, t+∆t)− 2ps(y, t+∆t) + ps(y +∆y, t+∆t)
(∆y)2
,
where ∆t and ∆y are timestep and spacestep of the simulation, respectively. Substituting into
Eq. (6) and solving for ps(y, t) at each point on a mesh y for y gives the system of equations:
Aps(y, t+∆t) = p(y, t), (33)
where A is tridiagonal with elements along the primary off-diagonal. This system can be
inverted at each timestep and used to calculate the updates ps(y, t+∆t).
For the boundary conditions, we impose no-flux conditions at the mesh boundaries ±b. For
a standard drift-diffusion equation with drift A(y) and diffusion constant B(y), this condition
takes the form
J(±b, t) = A(±b)p(±b, t)− 1
2
∂
∂y
[
B(±b)2p(±b, t)] = 0. (34)
Using the finite difference approximations
∂ps(y, t)
∂y
≈ 3ps(y, t+∆t)− 4ps(y +∆y, t+∆t) + ps(y + 2∆y, t+∆t)
2∆y
,
∂ps(y, t)
∂y
≈ −ps(y − 2∆y, t+∆t) + 4ps(y −∆y, t+∆t)− 3ps(y, t+∆t)
2∆y
,
we can plug in ±b to the appropriate replacement and use Eq. (34) to find the appropriate
boundary terms for the system in Eq. (33).
Fig. 9 shows the results of Monte Carlo simulations compared against those from the CK
equations; Monte Carlo simulations are less smooth (Fig. 9A), making optimality calculations
less accurate. Furthermore, obtaining results that are close to those from the CK equations
takes much longer to run (Fig. 9B).
C Deriving differential CK Equation with internal noise
Here we provide intuition for the form of the diffusion coefficient in Eq. (13) for the belief
distribution of a normative observer strategy with additional internal noise of strength D.
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Starting with the SDE in Eq. (12), because
√
2mdWt and
√
2DdXt are increments of inde-
pendent Wiener processes, we can define a new Wiener process AdZt =
√
2mdWt +
√
2DdXt
that has the same statistics as the original summed Wiener processes (Gardiner, 2004). To
determine the appropriate effective diffusion constant A, we note that
Var[AdZt] = A
2Var[dZt] = A
2t
and
Var[
√
2mdWt +
√
2DdXt] = 2mVar[dWt] + 2DVar[dXt] = 2mt+ 2Dt.
This requires A =
√
2(m+D), and means Eq. (12) can be rewritten as
dy = x(t) ·mdt+
√
2(m+D)dZt − 2 h˜
h
sinh(y)dt,
which following Gardiner (2004), has the differential CK equation given by Eq. (13).
D Steady state solution of the bounded accumulator model
Steady state solutions of Eq. (16) are derived first by noting that ∂tp± = 0 implies
0 = ∓mp¯′±(y)±mp¯′′±(y) + [p¯∓(y)− p¯±(y)] , (35)
with boundary conditions p¯±(y)(±β) = p¯′±(±β). Eq. (35) has solutions
(
p¯+(y)
p¯−(y)
)
=
(
A
B
)
eαy ,
with characteristic equation m2α4−(m2 + 2m)α2 = 0. The characteristic roots are α = 0,±q,
where we define q =
√
1 + 2
m
. For α = 0, we have A = B, whereas for α = ±q, the symmetry
p¯+(y) = p¯−(−y) implies B = (mq − (m + 1))A for α = +q and A = (mq − (m + 1))B for
α = −q. Lastly, defining the sum p¯s(y) = p¯+(y) + p¯−(−y), we obtain
p¯s(y) = C1 + C2
[
eqy + (mq − (m+ 1)) e−qy] .
The no flux boundary conditions p¯s(±β)− ∂p¯s(±β)∂y = 0 along with the normalization require-
ment
∫ β
−β p¯s(y)dy = 1 give explicit expressions for the constants
C1 =
1
2β
− C2
(
m(q − 1) sinh(qβ)
qβ
)
and
C2 =
{
2β
[
(q − 1)
(
eqβ +
m sinh(qβ)
qβ
)
− (q + 1)(mq − (m+ 1))e−qβ
]}−1
.
E Steady state solution of the clicks-task bounded accumulator model
Considering Eq. (23), we look for stationary solutions of the form
(
p¯+(n)
p¯−(n)
)
=
(
C1
C2
)
αn,
yielding the characteristic equation[
r+α
n−1 + r−αn+1 − rsαn
] [
r−αn−1 + r+αn+1 − rsαn
]− α2n = 0, (36)
where rs = r+ + r− + 1. Solving Eq. (36) gives α = 1 with eigenfunction C1 = C2 and two
roots α = q± of the quadratic α2−α(r+ + r2+ + r−+ r2−)/(r+r−) + 1 = 0. Superimposing the
eigenfunctions, redefining constants, and defining p¯s(n) = p¯+(n) + p¯−(−n) gives the general
solution
p¯s(n) = C1 + C2q
n
+ + C3q
n
−.
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The constants C1, C2, and C3 can be determined by normalization
∑β
n=−β p¯s(n) = 1 and the
stationary boundary conditions
r+p¯s(β − 1)− r−p¯s(β) + p¯s(−β)− p¯s(β) = 0,
r−p¯s(−β + 1)− r+p¯s(−β) + p¯s(β)− p¯s(−β) = 0.
Long term accuracy of the bounded accumulator is then determined by the weighted sum
Acc∞(β) = 12 p¯s(0) +
∑β
n=1 p¯s(n).
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